Identity and representation in Russia's regions: Adopting a critical theory perspective  by Makarychev, Andrey
le at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 185–192Contents lists availabJournal of Eurasian Studies
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/eurasIdentity and representation in Russia’s regions: Adopting a critical theory
perspective
Andrey Makarychev
Institute for East European Studies, Free University of Berlin, Germanya r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 9 September 2011
Accepted 25 January 2012E-mail address: asmakarychev@gmail.com.
Peer-review under responsibility of Asia-Paciﬁc Rese
University.
1879-3665/$ – see front matter Copyright 2012, A
doi:10.1016/j.euras.2012.03.009a b s t r a c t
In this paper, the author seeks to ﬁnd pathways of extrapolating the critical potential of
post-structuralist reasoning to the study of Russia’s domestic regions’ policies. He argues
that ideas, norms and rhetorical frames are important ideational arguments to explain
policy outcomes in speciﬁc Russia’s region and in the whole system of Russian federalism.
Analysis of Russian regionalism, therefore, can be enriched by engaging with and adopting
the new concepts and tools bringing attention to the power of regional identities as
exempliﬁed by different types of discourses.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
There is a variety of theoretical approaches that appear to
be instrumental in understanding the phenomenon of
regionalism. One possible way of conceptualizing sub-
national regions is grounded in the agent–structure debate.
Within this broad theoretical framework, sub-national
regions might be equated with agents, while the entire
system of federative (including center–periphery) relations
could be presented as structure. What lays at the intersection
of agents–structure interaction is a set of various institutions
which, as all rules of the game, are capable of both inciting and
restricting agents’ behaviour within the structural frame.
Yet what kind of agents are of utmost importance in
terms of changing the modus operandi of structures?arch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, HaIn political theory, there are two dominant traditions that
may be recalled at this point. Oneof them is of a state-centric
background: it is the sovereign who has the monopoly on
upgrading the rules of the game and inventing new ones. In
this logic, all institutional innovations are generated in the
core of political system, and – more speciﬁcally – are driven
by the political will of the central rulers. A second answer to
this question – which I treat as more appropriate for this
study – suggests that the main impulses that foster insti-
tutional change are channeled through the activity of those
elements of the structure that lack their ﬁxed and properly
deﬁned place in it and, therefore, are likely to disturb its
stability. This argument was mainly formulated in post-
structuralist conceptualizations of power and politics. In
comparison to the agent–structure debate, post-
structuralism attempts to make a step further in problem-
atizing the structure and presenting it as inherently
vulnerable, unstable, prone tomultiple intrinsic dislocations
and challenged by those elements that resist their allocated
subordinate places in the system.
It is from here that the analysis of Russian sub-national
regions’ activity may start. In 1990s the studies of Russian
regionalism were mainly focused on the mechanisms of
decomposition, fragmentation and erosion of statenyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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tion and external activities of federate units were seen as key
elements in the new model of governance with the
perspective of dismounting the structural foundations of
centralized national state and replacing it with networks of
regions. However, this analytical framework seems to over-
simplify the problem by describing regions’ self-assertion –
both domestic and trans-national – as presumably objective
and unavoidable process lacking either counter-moves or
alternatives. In the meantime, it is our understanding that
“regionalism is best viewed as an unstable and indetermi-
nate process of multiple and competing logics with no
overriding teleology or single-end point” (Hurrell, 2007).
Thus, contingency, indeterminacy and instability are inher-
ently present in federal politics, which involves the study of
key regional subjects and their modes of representation,
image building and political discourse strategies. This
approach would involve treating regions as actors that are
not merely pursuing their interests, but are engaged in
construction and representation of regional identities.
In this study I present a research framework that
focuses on regional representation strategies and explore
the analytical leverage of considering regional behavior
as constrained by identity-construction and representa-
tion rather than solely by interests. I argue that such
non-rationalist approach based on a careful consider-
ation of regional representation strategies in the 1990s
provides an important clue for some remaining ques-
tions in the evolution of Russian federalism. Yet not all
sub-national regions may be viewed as actors with
strong potential of attaining political subjectivity. Again,
it is the multiplicity of post-structuralist departures that
may be helpful in arguing that in order to identify the
sources of change within institutional structures we
ought to pay attention to those regional units that are in
a possession of an ability “to be more than themselves”,
or, in other words, that are capable of representing some
trends that stretch beyond their particular identities.
Against this background, I venture to explore the rele-
vance of regional discourses and identity-construction to
demonstrate that regional representation strategies in
the 1990s worked for the most part to promote regions
as singular entities not related to each other through
common goals and interests. Regions frequently reached
out to foreign entities and to the past in their effort to
construct and express their identity. No cohesive posi-
tion that would unite different regions and make them
act out of solidarity and commonality of aims could be
constructed given the prevailing representation strate-
gies. This made regions vulnerable to the political
discourse promoted by the center. In the context of
disjointed regional singularities, the center could easily
establish what Ernesto Laclau refers to as a ‘hegemonic
relation.’ This is precisely what happened when Putin
initiated a new project of state-building and construct-
ing the vertical of power that easily integrated regional
elites within its structure.11 I am grateful to Gulnaz Sharafutdinova for her insightful remarks and
comments to the earlier drafts of this paper.2. Post-structuralist conceptualizations of space,
territoriality and regional subjectivity
Seen from the perspective given above, one may argue
that thephenomenonof regionalismmaybeviewed through
a binary opposition between singularity and universality,
which otherwise may be presented as a collision of excep-
tions and models, or norm-breaking versus norm-setting
practices. What is remarkable here is that some of Russia’s
regions can be viewed as both exceptions (i.e. peculiar units
possessing their speciﬁcity and distinctiveness) and models
(i.e. examples for awider scope of regional actors). Referring
to the experience of the Nordic regionalism, Christopher
Browning argued that the major tension is to be found
between “its identity element of exceptionalism (implying
constant difference) and its emphasis on being a model
(implying others can become like us). The result is that to the
extent that the brand has been successfully sold it threatens
its very existence as a model of exceptionalism” (Browning,
2007: 45). Presumably, this explanatory framework may be
applicable to the cases of Russian regionalism as well.
Another inﬂuential theory important for this analysis is
Ernesto Laclau with his concept of “the rebellion of various
particularisms”. Laclau nicely grasped the key point of
current political debates on center–periphery relations by
saying that “both universalism and particularism are two
ineradicable dimensions in the making of political identi-
ties, but. the articulation between them is far from being
evident. The dominant tendencies have been polarized
around two positions. One of them unilaterally privileges
universalism and sees in a dialogical process a way of
reaching a consensus transcending all particularism; the
other, dedicated to the celebration of pure particularism
and contextualism, proclaims the death of the universal (as
in some forms of postmodernism)” (Laclau, 2007: VIII).
Extrapolating this conceptual framework to the ﬁeld of this
study, one may assume that the ﬁrst trend roughly corre-
sponds to the policy of the federal center imposing a uniﬁed
pattern of governance all across Russia (according to this
logic, “the particular can only corrupt the universal” (Laclau,
2007: 22) and therefore has to be cancelled/disavowed),
while the second one seems to reﬂect the state ofmind of all
forms of autonomy-driven regionalist movements.
What is worth of attention is that at the intersection of
these two tendencies one may ﬁnd a “the emergence of the
universal within the particular” (Laclau, 2007: 14). The
application of this approach to the realm of my analysis is
feasible in twoways. On the one hand, it leads us to assume
that each particular region involved in political activity has
to appeal to what it thinks of as allegedly universal norms
(like democracy, local autonomy, minority protection,
subsidiarity, trans-border cooperation, people’s diplomacy,
etc.). There are many examples of this sort in the West:
Quebec, for example, is a strong supporter of a number of
allegedly universal principles – from free trade to human
rights protection (Parizeau, 1995).
On the other hand, the ideas of Laclau can be under-
stood in a sense that what makes regions symptoms is not
only their appeal to global norms but – what is even more
substantial – their ability to incarnate/reﬂect some of the
most meaningful trends and vectors that are constitutive
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regions that can’t be completely subdued and absorbed by
the vertical –of power federal system of governance are
symptoms of the impossibility to run the country from one
single center and, therefore, of the necessity to acknowl-
edge the limits of the re-centralization project launched by
Putin a decade ago.
These two aspects, obviously, are the two sides of the
same coin. St. Petersburg can serve a good example of a city-
region developing and promoting its international image by
referring to its ability to be part of “world culture” and,
therefore, to become a showcase of Russian Westernization
(Boym, 2001). In the meantime, it is exactly due to its inter-
national credentials that St. Petersburg deserved a special
status within the federation, which gave some palpable
results (like convening major international events and host-
ing the Constitutional Court removed fromMoscow in 2007).
To come back to Laclau, “no particularity can be
constituted except by maintaining an internal reference to
universality as that which is missing” (Laclau, 2007: 31). Yet
his reasoning is evenmore complicated: he argues that “the
relations between particularity and universality is an
essentially unstable and undecidable one. Particularity
both denies and requires totality. Totality is impossible
and, at the same time, is required by the particular: in that
sense, it is present in the particular as that which is absent,
as a constitutive lack which constantly forces the particular
to be more than itself, to assume a universal role which can
only be precarious” (Laclau, 2007: 15). That is why regions
with strong local identities have to ﬁnd a proper balance
between stressing their separate differences, on the one
hand, and adhering to some universal principles appealing
to wider political milieu, on the other. I will turn to this
issue in the following section.
3. Models of regional representation
To analyze the regional identity formation based upon
regional representation strategies in the 1990s I employ
Ernesto Laclau’s analytical distinction between the two
logics – of difference and equivalence – that operate in the
social and political ﬁeld (Laclau, 2005: 70). The logic of
difference presupposes regions’ individual moves aimed at
ﬁnding their particular subject positions within the struc-
ture of Russian federalism. The logic of equivalence postu-
lates that regions are able to construct and reify their
subjectivity through some kind of collective actions based
upon the principle of similarity (that certain regions are
similar in their relation to the center). It appears that in the
1990s the logic of difference dominated and the logic of
equivalence was very scarce; the resulting disjointed
regionalism was therefore vulnerable to establishing
a ‘hegemonic relation’ by the center. Regions invested in
forging their singular identities at the expense of the
promotion ofmore universal ideas that could provide fertile
ground for collective regional action and coalition-building.
3.1. The logic of difference and equivalence in action
In accordance with the logic of difference, many sub-
national units developed their representation strategiesdifferentially, i.e. on an individual basis and emphasizing
their particularity. Individual regional identities were not
directly linked to each other and did not necessarily reﬂect
or appeal to something that reaches beyond their bound-
aries. This de-centralized model of regionalism could be
dubbed a “Russian archipelago” – a persuasive metaphor
pointing to a very fragmented space dominated by
centrifugal forces with heterogeneous regional “islands”
that lacked strong mutual ties (Rodin, 2004: 95). This
pattern of spatial organization is close to what Slavoj Zizek
ventured to ﬁguratively call “organs without bodies.” This
unusual and intellectually provoking metaphor might be
a useful tool for conceptualizing regions’ self-assertion as
“partial objects” eager to produce their own identity
discourses, sometimes in clear dissociation from the federal
center and in conﬂict with other regions.
The individualistic way of regions’ self-promotion may
be exempliﬁed by discursive battles between regions on
the domestic scene. For instance, Pskov’s identity-building
efforts consist of the attempted “cultural rivalry” with St.
Petersburg and Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod competes for
the informal status of Russia’s “third capital” with Kazan,
and so on. For the purpose of this analysis it could be
assumed – with a certain degree of creative imagination –
that in the 1990s Russian federal system became “vaguely
coordinated agglomerate of partial objects” that “seem to
lead their own particular lives.” An agglomeration of
“partial objects” is a nice formula to describe the ruptures
and disconnections within the fabric of “region-centered
asymmetric” federalism (Rodin, 2006).
Jean Baudrillard’s references to “marginal,” “unique,”
“odd,” “exotic,” “eccentric” objects that deny their inclu-
sion/inscription into the larger system on conditions equal
to others as well as Slavoj Zizek’s concept of a “surplus
element” that is “thoroughly out of place” (Zizek, 2000: 27)
not easily accommodated and domesticated by the system,
tending to separate and move away in search of alternative
spatial or territorial afﬁliations appear helpful in under-
standing the nature of Russian federalism in the 1990s.
Baudrillard points to the objects that challenge the
uniformity of the system they formally belong to. By the
very virtue of their existence they dislocate the existing
hierarchy of established relations. These objects, formally
being parts of a certain system, tend to break out into other
spaces – for example, those related to the historic memo-
ries or other cultures (Baudrillard, 1991: 61–63). In the
context of Russian federalism, the Kaliningrad oblast,
Russian enclave in the Baltic sea, could be discussed as an
analogue of a “unique” and “marginal” object, a sort of “war
trophy” seeking to reach beyond the framework deter-
mined by the Russian federal system and ﬁnd its niche in
the context of Russia’s relations with the entire Europe in
general and the Baltic Sea region in particular. St. Peters-
burg is another city the alleged “eccentricity” of which
makes this “Northern capital” a kind of “internal analog of
an external center” (Koroliov, 1997: 67), a city irreducible to
“Russian average” and, in a certain sense, dissimilar to
surrounding territories. Here we see strong allusions to the
exceptionality of this regionwhich is dubbed “a foreigner in
its own land”, or a “rootless cosmopolitan.” Yet it is exactly
these exceptional traits that are constitutive for the region’s
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which has a potential to evolve in time into what would be
considered as something indispensable for Russia’s
national identity (Anisimov, 2002: 37) A number of other
territories (such as Primorsky krai, for instance) cam-
paigned for a ‘special’ status emphasizing their frontier
position, historical traditions and economic necessities.
As asserted by Laclau, the relationship between the logic
of difference and logic of equivalence is dialectical: “the
particularized element does not simply remain as purely
particular, but enters into a different set of equivalences”
(Laclau, 2000: 304) exhibiting features similar to other
particulars. He argues that “there is a possibility that one
difference, without ceasing to be a particular difference,
assumes the representation of an incommensurable
totality. In that way, its body is split between the particu-
larity which it still is and the more universal signiﬁcation of
which it is the bearer” (Laclau, 2005: 70). In the same vein,
Giorgio Agamben speaks of a fragment that “pretends to
be more than itself, hints to a more general, inﬁnite
dimension. shows its belongingness to a class, but for this
very reason it steps out of this class at the very moment in
which it exhibits and deﬁnes it” (Agamben, 2002). In other
words, each particular element of Russia’s federal structure,
even trying to distinguish itself from other regional units, is
likely to associate itself with some external regions, cultures
or patterns of development. This brings us to the analysis of
intricacies of the “logic of equivalence” which, in accor-
dancewith the premises of critical theory, might potentially
lead to the formation of strong regional actors whose
political subjectivity would be grounded in their ability to
represent a wider spectrum of units and identities that
sustain them. The exploration of how the logic of equiva-
lences worked in the 1990s reveals that, for the most part,
Russia’s regions constructed the chains of equivalence with
foreign countries and regions rather than with other
Russian regions. It was the external milieu that contained
imaginary “chains of equivalences” that Russian regions
wished to plug in, further contributing to the disjointed
character of Russian federalism.
For example, for Novgorod and Kaliningrad one of those
“chains” was exempliﬁed by a contemporary version of the
Hanseatic League; the informal title of St. Petersburg as
Russia’s “Northern capital” alludes to this city’s multiple
associations with its Nordic and Scandinavian partners; the
revival of Karelian identity places this republic in a group of
Finno-Ugrian territories dispersed within both Europe and
Russia (i.e. Finland,Hungary, Estonia, Republic of Komi); and
the most radical version of Kaliningrad’s autonomy was
articulated through a concept of the “Fourth Baltic
Republic.” Furthermore, different models of the so-called
“growth triangles,” especially in the areas of the Gulf of
Finland (SouthernFinland, Estonia andSt. Petersburg), could
serve as a good example of various external links advocated
by Russian regions similar to scenarios ‘geometrically’ con-
necting Kaliningrad, Lithuania and the neighbouring areas
of Poland. In each of these cases, the “growth triangle”
concept is aimed at capitalizing on the parties’ economic
complementarities, their geographic proximity, and
common infrastructure projects (Kivikari, 2001: 13,17).
Same approaches are readable in such transportationschemes as “Northern ray” (St. Petersburg–Helsinki–Stock-
holm), “Southern ray” (St. Petersburg–Ukraine–Moldova–
Romania–Bulgaria–Greece); “Asian ray” (St. Petersburg–
Central Asia–China), “Far Eastern ray” (Trans-Siberian rail
road); as well as the modern version of the “The Way from
Varagians to Greeks and Hazars,” “King’s Road” from
Norway to St. Petersburg through Sweden (How to., 2000:
42), “The Murmansk corridor” from Kirkenes to the Kola
isthmus, “The Arkhangelsk corridor” to connect German
industrial centers, ports of the Gulf of Bothnia and Russia’s
North East, the “Blue Road” (a highway and a tourist route
crossing Norway, Sweden, Finland and Karelia), the “Baltic
Palette” (a group of cities including Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga
and Stockholm), and South Baltic Arc (Lubec–Rostock–
Szczecin–Gdansk–Kaliningrad–Klaipeda–Karlskrona) that
can also be added to the list. The Murmansk oblast was
labelled as “NewRuhr” (or “NorthernNear East”) for its huge
natural resources, while the Kaliningrad oblast promoted
itself as “Russian Hong Kong.”
In St. Petersburg there is a number of “foreign” topo-
nymic metaphors inscribed into the identity of this city
which developed and promoted its international image
through the references to its ability to be part of “world
culture” and, therefore, to become a showcase of Russian
Westernization (Boym, 2001). The “new Venice” metaphor
contains strong associations with skillful diplomacy, world-
class culture, and well-developed trade relations, while in
the “new Rome” one may discover some imperial
and geopolitical allusions (Joenniemi, 2003: 590). Other
authors add another metaphor to the list – a “new Jer-
usalem”, suggesting that due to the skillful re-actualization
of the images derived from other cities’ geographies, St.
Petersburg turns into a meaningful resemblance of the
Western civilization (Kaganov, 2002: 46–48). The “Russian
Amsterdam” scenario is meant to turn St. Petersburg into
a transportation hub and communication center for East–
West commodities ﬂows, while the “Russian Boston” idea
presumes to make St. Petersburg one of the leading centers
in Russian education (Schiolkin, undated).
What these multiple examples illuminate is that the
logic of equivalences was mobilized when there were
attractive external poles of gravitation, which incited –
perhaps unintentionally – the process of association and
identiﬁcation. Much less numerous were examples of the
chains of equivalences meant to oppose the internal pole of
power – the federal center. There were only a few regions
that possessed the ability “to be more than themselves,” or,
in other words, were capable of representing some regional
trends that stretch beyond their particular identities.
One example is the Kaliningrad oblast, which presented
itself as a “pilot region” and thus tried to universalize “its
own particularism” (Laclau, 2007: 24), i.e. establish
a comprehensive model of cross-border interaction that
hypothetically might be both integrated into Russia’s
Europeanizationprocess and projected to themultiplicity of
other regions. Symptomatically, in order toﬁt into the “pilot
region” concept, Kaliningrad has to be a different kind of
region, showing capacities to become an actor “not like
others” in many respects. Many authors argued that the
Kaliningrad oblast could be a model for Russia’s integration
into Europe; at theminimum, the function of Kaliningrad as
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North West (Kortunov, 2004). The region may also play the
role of representing the North-Western Russia in the Baltic
Sea Region, and simultaneously think of itself as a place for
perfecting schemes of cooperation that could later be pro-
jected to other Russian regions (for example, in the issues of
investments and legal approximation) (Zverev, 2007: 23).
Metaphors like “Russia’s cultural outpost” or “a training
institution for Russian periphery” (Klemeshev & Fiodorov,
2002: 6) – as applicable to Kaliningrad – could serve as
good examples of representative functions. A “demonstra-
tion ground”, a “contact territory,” a “vanguard” of Russia’s
rapprochement with Europe, an “indicator” and an “inter-
face” of EU–Russia relations, a “linking space”, an “experi-
mental zone,” an “outpost” of strategic partnership, Russia’s
“business card,” a “nodal link,” “litmus test” (Silva, 2001),
and other metaphors are all quite telling in this regard.
The Republic of Tatarstan is another example of a region
that tried to play a representative function for all ethnic
regions in Russia. While focusing on its individual relations
with the federal center, Tatarstan has often publicly framed
its ‘autonomy-seeking’ arguments in more universalistic
terms. Tatarstan’s policies – especially in 1990s – were
meant to offer an alternative model of federalism appealing
to other constitutive units of the Russian Federation. With
this aim, the republic has actively sponsored scholarship on
federalism, setting up Kazan Institute of Federalism,
convening numerous conferences and workshops, intro-
ducing and promoting new concepts in center–regional
relations, frequently borrowed fromother federal contexts.2
To summarize, according to representation strategies
adopted by particular regions, Kaliningrad was not just an
individual region within Russia but a “little Russia,”
symbolizing and representing Russia’s strategic interests in
Europe (Aalto, 2000: 33). Tatarstan was not just one of the
ethnic units in the federation but the one that claimed to
represent the interests of all ethnic units and, arguably,
entire Russia conceived as a strong federal statewith strong
center and strong regions. It is such intermingling of the
regionalizing and universalizing discourses that was
constitutive for the molding of regional identities. Each of
these particular regions embodied “the universal in the
exception” and thus bore political connotations.
The crucial weakness of such regional representation
strategies was that regions seeking to perform represen-
tative functions were reluctant to admit that they have to
be, in away, typical (“like dozens of others”) regions. On the
contrary, they claimed to possess original, distinctive and
irreducible to the “average” features, deeply embedded in
local traditions and historical memories. For instance, on
the one hand, the pilot strategy of the Kaliningrad oblast
contained universalising effects that eventually boosted the
region’s claims for greater status within the federation as
an “example”, a “model” whose experience is applicable to
other regions nationwide. Yet on the other hand, region’s
behaviour was rather individualistic, since region’s identity
developed in a competitionwith other Russian regions that2 See for example the work of the Kazan Institute of Federalism at
www.kazanfed.ru.claimed to be the frontrunners in the Russia–EU relation-
ship. Similarly, Tatarstan constantly sought preferential
treatment from the federal center, while developing and
promoting more universalizing discourse that would
advance such formulas as “strong regions – strong center”.
In short, the representation strategies were somewhat
contradictory and, in the end, privileged the particular over
the universal, leaving for the federal center to promote the
universal and establish a hegemonic relation.
On the one hand, these two logics – of equivalence and
of difference – seem to be in conﬂict with each other; yet on
the other hand, they require and presuppose each other as
necessary conditions for the construction of regional
identities. This is so because, onemay argue, “all social (that
is, discursive) identity is constituted at the meeting point of
difference and equivalence” (Laclau, 2007: 80). Therefore,
the logics of difference and equivalence represent the two
extreme points in the spectrum of regions’ identity-
building policies. Each of the endeavours to ﬁx regional
identities is a ﬂuid combination of different moves that
ultimately are derivatives of both of these logics.
Yetwhat is evenmore important is that in the light of the
difference – equivalence dichotomy the very idea of “partial
objects” could be reformulated: “the partial object is not
a part of a whole but a part which is the whole” (Laclau,
2005: 113). This utterance offers a conﬂation of the two
logics: it is through a certain part of the whole (a region)
that the political scene of the country could be disclosed
and expressed. In terms of Laclau, “the partial object ceases
to be a partiality evoking a totality, and becomes . the
name of that totality” (Laclau, 2005: 114). It is at this point
that the regionalizing and universalizing discourses inter-
mingle, and this intermixture is constitutive for the
molding of the regional identity-building process.
4. The ‘real’ and the ‘simulated’ in the making of
regional autonomy
The rationalist scholarship presents and treats regional
power and autonomy as something that regions ‘possessed’
in the 1990s. The alternative and complementary under-
standing of federal relations in the 1990s would stress that
regional power and autonomy were something that regions
‘performed’ and ‘enacted.’Much of regions’ strategies of self-
assertion were “virtual” in a sense that they resembled
regional PR campaigns and many of the ‘chains of equiva-
lences’ discussed earlier were of imaginary nature
(Uspenskii, 2004). Yet it is exactly these “virtual discourses”
that substantiated regions’performances and identiﬁcations.
For example, in the 1990s Novgorod under the gover-
norship of Mikhail Prusak won an international reputation
of an “outspoken champion of liberal, market-oriented
economic reform” and even “the model of present
Western economic theory and business.” (Ruble & Popson,
1998: 433–445). However, in 2007 it turned out that the
regional economy was controlled by two competing crim-
inal groups that incapacitated the governor who eventually
was ﬁred by the President. Another good example of
“virtual” strategies was Nizhny Novgorod, a region that in
the ﬁrst half of 1990s was widely referred to as a leader of
free-market capitalist reforms. However, a few years after
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was won by a communist candidate, who strongly chal-
lenged the image of the region as a hotbed ofWestern-style
reforms. This image deteriorated further with the advent to
power in Nizhny Novgorod of a group of Moscow-based
administrators who in fact performed a function of
“external management” of an economically unsustainable
territory.
As discussed earlier, the case of Tatarstan (as well as
several other ethnic republics) is no less illustrative of
creative and simulative technologies involved in the
making of regional autonomy. Tatarstan’s main strategy
involved a pretense of behaving like a state, enacting and
projecting sovereignty at home and abroad (Graney, 2009).
Not only did Tatarstan follow Russia in adopting the
Declaration of Sovereignty; it also pursued other symbolic
attributes of statehood designing its own ﬂag and the code
of arms, electing its own president, adopting its own
Constitution, and establishing its own Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Similar technologies were used by all the actors that
declared sovereignty.
Among the most curious attempts to construct “virtual
identities” is a peculiar project of an imagined territory
named “Smirnovia”. The idea circulated for some time in
Ivanovo oblast where, according to estimates, the majority
of people with the Smirnov family name reside. Another
example of ostensibly virtual identity-building is the rein-
vention of the so-called “neo-Novgorodian republic,”
which is believed to become an inheritor of ancient Nov-
gorod, a city known for its grass-roots democracy and
inclusion in the Hanseatic League, a network of North
European cities specializing in trade and commerce.
The idea about the ‘simulated’ character of regional
autonomy in the 1990s does not imply that autonomy was
not real in a sense of being non-consequential, shallow, or
based on entirely voluntaristic actions of regional elites.
Regional ‘simulations’ did reﬂect and even result in
a greater autonomy and additional privileges the regions
enjoyed within the Russian Federation (especially in the
case of ethnic republics). The concept of ‘simulation’ helps
to apprehend the ‘contingent’ nature of regional autonomy;
the fact that it did require active regional agency and
particularly symbolic and expressive actions by regional
elites. Regional inﬂuence was not simply predetermined by
the alleged center’s weakness or the functional require-
ments of economic liberalization. In the political context of
the 1990s the republican sovereignty became “what the
republics made of it;” but the republics had to rely in their
actions on the political discourse that dominated at that
time.
5. The limits of the Kremlin’s re-centralization project
A more careful consideration of representation issues is
also warranted in the analysis of contemporary develop-
ments in Russia’s center–regional relations. The common-
place assessments of the results of Putin’s federal reforms
converge on the idea that the package of legal, ﬁscal and
institutional reforms worked to radically restructure the
center–regional relations in the positive direction. Alleg-
edly, these reforms worked to unify and harmonize Russia;in more radical interpretation, they ‘saved’ Russia from
potential fragmentation, disintegration and even collapse.
An emphasis on representation mechanisms would
however introduce a degree of skepticism with regards to
ofﬁcial pronouncements about the outcomes of these
reforms. A more careful investigation reveals that, similar
to the overstated regional autonomy of the 1990s, the
effects of federal reforms on Russian federalism and the
ease with which they were implemented have also been
overestimated. The alleged success of these reforms was
also partially ‘simulated’ just like the regional autonomy
has been ‘simulated’ in the 1990s. Putin changed the
dominant political discourse, forcing the regional leaders
into a new ideological/political ﬁeld deﬁned by state-
building and “vertical of power” construction. The
regions however can’t be completely absorbed and inte-
grated into such system of governance. There are clear
symptoms of the impossibility to run the country from just
one center that reveal the limits of the re-centralization
project.
In Slavoj Zizek’s vocabulary, “symptoms” denote
moments when a blockage of the given social order
emerges. Zizek posits that a symptom “is the exception
which disturbs the surface of false appearance, the point at
which the repressed truth erupts”. Therefore, the logic
goes on, the existing “universal order” (in the Russian case
– the proverbial “vertical of power”, the integrity and
uniformity of the nation, “sovereign democracy”, etc.) may
be problematized “on behalf of its symptom, of the part
that, although inherent to the existing universal order, has
no ‘proper place’ within it.” In our context symptoms are
referred to certain situations that subvert the ofﬁcial
interpretations and, at the same time, reﬂect some of the
most meaningful trends and vectors constitutive for the
Russian federalism. These are situations and cases that
“disturb the surface of false appearance” of an over-
whelming success of Putin’s efforts to recentralize Russia.
These symptoms emerge in different spheres, but all of
them point to the failure of the re-uniﬁcation/re-
centralization project as conceived by Putin from the
outset of his presidency.
The limits of central reach in the regions were clearly
seen in the analysis of federal intervention in regional
elections. Moraski and Reisinger reported that, despite all
the institutional changes (with federal districts, presiden-
tial envoys, etc.), the Kremlin’s inﬂuence in regional elec-
tions was very limited. “Not only was the Kremlin unable to
protect those incumbents whom it supported, but its pref-
erence for ousting a sitting governor had, at best, an indirect
effect on the election’s ultimate outcome” (Moraski &
Reisinger, 2007: 616). It is in response to this perceived
weakness that Putin ﬁnally decided to abandon regional
elections altogether, the authors claim. Similar observations
about Kremlin’s weakness in inﬂuencing regional elections
are made by other scholars although some analysts have
also noted that Kremlin’s “success rate” in getting their
favorites elected or re-elected has increased dramatically
towards the end of Putin’s ﬁrst term (Chebankova, 2005:
941–942).
The developments in Russia’s Caucasian regions are
increasingly dictated by security considerations which
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Russia in terms of obvious speciﬁcity of not only their
cultural identities but also of their political – even geopo-
litical – orientations. Republics like Dagestan, Ingushetia,
Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia were
always relatively immune from the ﬂuctuations of the
federal center’s policies since their traditional systems of
governance were decided locally, being products of the
distribution of power resources among indigenous clan-
like groups. Yet the sharpening of the security concerns –
partly stemming from the overall complication of geopo-
litical situation in the aftermath of the war with Georgia in
August 2008 and the subsequent recognition by Russia of
Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia – only add new constrains
to the policies of Moscow in these remote peripheral
regions and exacerbate their claims for exceptional treat-
ment from by federal authorities.
Chechnya has also been able to preserve its special
status in Russia not only because it was the only other
region besides Tatarstan that signed a bilateral treaty with
Moscow but also because Putin practically left Chechnya
under full control of Ramzan Kadyrov and his military
forces. As poignantly noted by some commentators,
Chechnya achieved the degree of independence from
Russia it sought out in the 1990s (Latynina, 2006). Keeping
in mind the outrageous murders of Kadyrov’s opponents
that have occurred in Moscow, it could be suggested that
his reach is not limited to the Chechen territory. Kadyrov’s
reach was extended ofﬁcially after the murder of Ingush-
etia’s president in June 2009 when he was selected by the
federal center as aman responsible for establishing security
and order in the whole of Russia’s Caucasus (Malashenko,
2009). The recent termination by Moscow of the “regime
of counter-terrorist operation” in Chechnya, a decision
strongly lobbied by Kadyrov, may also be viewed as an
example of successful regional pressure upon Moscow. In
short, it is evident that as long as the Chechen president
maintains personal loyalty to Putin-Medvedev’s political
regime, he is allowed a practically free hand in ruling over
Chechnya and now even controlling the situation in the
neighboring republics.
The above examples deal with the weakest links in
federal center’s “vertical” policy towards regions. In the
meantime, on a horizontal level, i.e. between regions
themselves, a number of trends also set limits for the re-
uniﬁcation project and questioned the perspectives of
a centralized way of running the country. I will single out
only few of these trends, which seem to be most relevant.
For example, it turned out that regions may react differ-
ently to the policies of the federal government. For
example, the Kremlin’s decision to raise import duties for
foreign cars – as part of the anti-crisis program – was
harshly challenged in the Far East where most of the cars
are imported, but in the meantime supported in car-
producing regions like Nizhny Novgorod. Secondly,
certain signs of inter-regional conﬂicts reappeared. In the
sphere of regional identities, the most telling case was the
contest between Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan for the right
to bear the name of “Russia’s third capital”. The juridical
battle ended up in Kazan’s victory, but as a compromise
Nizhny Novgorod was ofﬁcially awarded the status of the“Volga capital.” Finally, in the economic sphere, the
ongoing crisis has re-actualized regional protectionist
strategies aimed not only at supporting local producers but
also at closing regional markets for merchandise coming
from other regions.
Thus, President Medvedev has to deal with the
increasing regional diversity in Russia manifested in the
spheres of economics, identity and security. It is quite
feasible that under certain circumstances the claims for
greater diversiﬁcation and autonomy could be formulated
in political categories, i.e. linked with the way power
resources are distributed between the federal center and
regions. Therefore, it is hard to expect that the future of the
center–regions relations in Russia will be void of conﬂicts.
6. Conclusion
This paper shed light on the incompleteness of rational
choice based explanations of the evolution of Russian
federal system. Interest based explanations cannot
adequately account for the sudden retreat of regional elites
that were widely viewed as powerful before the re-
centralization project started. Addressing this inadequacy,
I adopt a new framework that focuses on the issues of
identity and representation and treats regions not merely
as self-interested actors responding to incentives but as
social and political actors that engage in creative actions in
an attempt to shape the political ﬁeld and construct their
own identity. As I discuss in the paper, the creativity of
regional elites in constructing their identities and the
repertoire of actions available to them are both enlarged
and constrained by the image-making strategies they
choose. Thus, the choices made by the regions in the 1990s
to assert their particularity and special character and create
linkages to foreign cities and territories rather than to their
own neighbors, could not have worked to induce regional
collective action that could have become a bulwark against
the sweeping re-centralization undertaken by Putin.
The more ﬁne-tuned approach for analyzing federal
relations in Russia that considers the issues of identity and
representation strategies promotes a more nuanced
understanding of current federal relations as well. Speciﬁ-
cally, as I show in this paper, scholars need to be more
cautious in evaluating the alleged success of Putin’s
recentralizing measures. The still remaining and indeed
increasing regional diversity and particularity reveals the
need for a more nuanced and differentiated policy on the
side of the federal center vis-a-vis the regions in Russia.References
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